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Executive Summary
This paper is based on a representative survey among 2034 households in North East Af-
ghanistan, conducted in spring 2007. The main results of the survey can be summarized as 
follows:
Many Western observers claim that the security situation in North Afghanistan is rapidly dete-
riorating. We find that this sentiment is not shared by the majority of the rural population. An 
overwhelming majority thinks that security has very much increased over the last two years. 
Most Afghans credit foreign forces as well as the Afghan government with this progress.
Despite substantial progress in security one fifth of all households feel that their physical 
security is threatened. They feel that the main threat does not stem from Taliban or other 
armed forces but from organized crime. Five percent also said that they feel threatened by 
foreign forces.
International development agencies are widely credited by Afghans for bringing along positive 
and widespread changes in basic services for many communities, most notably with regard 
to drinking water, roads and schooling. Progress in other fields seems to be slower. Afghans 
tend to think that international development agencies have had little impact on progress in 
the agricultural sector and in improving access to electricity. Afghans also support activities 
of international actors that are usually associated with western values which are often seen 
as being at odds with Afghan values. Even in a rural context there is much support for state 
schooling, girls’ enrollment in schools, and off-farm job opportunities for men and women.
Despite these positive assessments of foreign involvement, many Afghans remain cautious. 
43% of households thought that the presence of foreign troops in general posed a threat to 
the local way of life and Islamic values in the community, and 21% of respondents thought 
that foreign developmental aid threatens the local way of life and Islamic values. Taken to-
gether, this is still a supportive environment for development cooperation, because most 
Afghans seem to value the concrete benefits of the foreign presence, despite widespread 
cultural or ideological wariness.
We find statistical evidence that development aid has a positive impact on attitudes towards 
the peace building mission. Communities that have broadly profited from development aid 
show greater support for international actors and their objectives. Development aid, however, 
does not lead to a lower threat perception. Levels of received aid do not influence the levels 
of threats that people perceive, indicating that development aid per se has little impact on 
objective security threats. Threat perceptions differ between districts. People in Aliabad feel 
more threatened, and they fear the Taliban. People in Imam Sahib feel least threatened, and 
here the main threat is, as in other districts, organized crime.
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We also found no evidence that development aid has so far increased Afghan state capacities 
in the perception of respondents. The state is virtually absent as a problem solver and serv-
ice provider. Most Afghans think that the state has not contributed to the provision of basic 
services and does not look after the needs of the rural population. This perception is hardly 
affected by levels of received development aid.
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Assessing the Contribution of International Actors in Afghanistan. 
Results from a Representative Survey1
Jan Koehler/Christoph Zürcher
Data
The analysis presented in this paper is based on a data set which was compiled from an original 
mass	survey.	We	surveyed	2034	households	in	77	communities	in	North	East	Afghanistan.	The	
communities are located in four districts: Imam Sahib, Aliabad, Warsaj and Taloqan. A map of 
the surveyed communities is provided in the appendix. The size of the sample varied according 
to the size of the community in order to ensure that the sample was representative for the com-
munity.	The	survey	was	conducted	in	April	2007.	Response	rates	were	above	95%.	Half	of	the	
communities were selected by random sampling. The remaining communities were selected in 
order	to	make	sure	that	the	sample	reflects	the	geographic,	climatic	and	ethnic	diversity	of	the	
four districts. The survey was designed to generate data on the perceptions of respondents on 
coverage and usefulness of development cooperation, everyday security, attitudes towards inter-
national actors, perception of state legitimacy, and communal organizational capacities.
Security
The provision of security is of paramount importance for the success of peace- and state buil-
ding missions. A peacebuilding mission can only succeed when the overall security situation 
rapidly increases. Furthermore, when the population perceives peacebuilders as contributing 
to increased security, the legitimacy of the mission will overall increase. We therefore wanted 
to	know	how	respondents	perceive	the	trends	in	the	security	situation.	Specifically,	we	asked	
whether respondents though that security increased or decreased over the past two years in 
their village.
An	overwhelming	majority	thought	that	security	has	very	much	increased	(76%)	or	somewhat	
increased	(23%).	Only	0,6%	thought	that	security	levels	decreased.	Less	than	1%	had	no	opinion	
on that question.
1 This study has been conducted in cooperation with the Evaluation Division of the Ministry for Eco-
nomic	Cooperation	and	Development	 (BMZ).	Results	are	published	as	Zürcher,	Christoph/Koehler,	
Jan/Böhnke,	Jan	2007:	Assessing	the	Impact	of	Development	Cooperation	in	North	East	Afghanistan.	
Interim	Report	(Evaluation	Reports	028,	Bundesministerium	für	wirtschaftliche	Zusammenarbeit	und	
Entwicklung),	Bonn.
 We gratefully acknowledge the support of many organizations and individuals. Sarah Riese, Cornelius 
Graubner, and Manija Gardizi provided, at various stages, research assistance.  The survey has been im-
plemented	under	very	difficult	conditions	by	CoAR	(Coordination	of	Afghan	Relief ).	We	are	especially	
grateful	to	Jan	Böhnke	for	contributing	to	the	design	of	the	questionnaires,	and	for	sharing	his	vast	
knowledge of statistical analysis. We thank the Volkswagen Stiftung and the Deutsche Forschungsge-
sellschaft	for	financial	support.
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Who contributed, according to respondents perceptions, to this improved security situation? We 
assumed	that	four	different	actors	could	have	had	an	impact:	The	Afghan	government,	foreign	
troops, local strongmen, and international organizations. We found that the positive changes 
are	widely	attributed	to	foreign	troops:	80%	of	respondents	thought	that	foreign	troops	contri-
buted positively to security.
This	 stands	 in	marked	contrast	 to	what	 respondents	 thought	about	 local	 commanders:	 78%	
thought	 that	 local	 commanders	 neither	 positively	 nor	 negatively	 influenced	 security	 levels,	
6	%	saw	a	positive	impact,	and	1%	thought	of	commanders	as	having	a	negative	impact,	hence	
actually contributing to insecurity. This is a strong indicator that the importance of the Jihadi 
commanders is still declining. It remains to be seen whether this trend continues. 
Figure 1: Perceived contribution of governmental and non-governmental actors to improved security
We	also	wanted	to	know	specifically	about	respondents’	attitude	towards	the	German	PRT	in	
Kunduz.	Surprisingly	few	had	actually	heard	about	the	PRT	(14%);	of	those	who	had	heard	about	
the	PRT,	52%	rather	agreed	and	25%	fully	agreed	with	the	statement	that	the	PRT	improved	
peace and security.
Next,	we	wanted	to	know	about	the	threat	perceptions	of	households.	We	asked	respondents	to	
indicate whether they felt threatened by foreign forces, Afghan security forces, Taliban, armed 
men from within the locality, armed men outside the locality, and criminal groups. 
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Figure 2: Perceived threats from different actors
20%	of	all	households	reported	that	they	were	afraid	of	one	or	many	of	these	actors.	If	we	only	
look	at	those	households	that	reported	threats,	an	interesting	picture	emerges:	17,3%	of	house-
holds	were	somewhat	or	very	afraid	of	criminal	groups,	10,6%	of	external	armed	men,	10	%	of	
Taliban.	5%	felt	threatened	by	foreign	forces	and	3%	of	local	armed	men.
Development aid 
The	provision	of	security	has	to	be	the	first	objective	of	the	international	presence.	But	many	
observers feel that the mission is likely to fail if the peace dividend is not shared with the popu-
lation	in	form	of	better	provisions	of	basic	services.	Hence,	development	cooperation	in	North	
East Afghanistan intends also to contribute to better basic infrastructure and services.
Generally	speaking,	the	level	of	development	is	very	low	even	in	North	East	Afghanistan	which	
has to be considered as a relatively well-to-do region within the country. With regard to our 
sample,	only	9%	had	their	drinking	water	from	piped	water	schemes,	and	only	25%	of	house-
holds	had	electricity.	7%	of	respondents	reported	that	it	was	difficult	to	buy	simple	food	prod-
ucts,	and	an	additional	23%	said	that	they	usually	could	afford	to	buy	food	but	that	it	was	hard	
to buy new cloths and to pay for social obligations.
First, we asked respondents about the type and number of development projects of which their 
households	or	their	community	as	a	whole	have	been	beneficiaries	between	2005	and	2007.	We	
found a surprisingly high coverage with projects being predominately in infrastructure. The 
question	“has	your	community	as	a	whole	been	a	beneficiary	of	development	cooperation	pro-
jects	during	the	last	two	years?”	produced	the	following	answers:	66%	of	respondents	reported	
that	their	community	benefited	from	projects	related	to	bridges	and	roads;	66%	of	respondents	
thought	that	the	community	benefited	from	drinking	water	projects;	47%	said	the	community	
benefited	from	schooling	projects,	24%	from	irrigation	projects,	16%	from	agricultural	extensi-
on	services,	14%	from	projects	related	to	power	supply;	6%	reported	of	having	received	food	aid,	
and	5,5%	reported	that	their	community	has	been	a	beneficiary	of	projects	related	to	training	
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and	capacity	building.	Only	2,	5%	of	respondents	thought	that	their	community	had	received	
projects that were aimed at creating new jobs. It is notable that communities that received a 
project in a given sector also reported that international development agencies overall contri-
buted positively to progress in this sector. We read this as a marker for high levels of satisfaction 
with the project work that is being done.
We	also	asked	respondents	to	report	if	their	household	had	been	a	beneficiary	of	development	
aid.	 10,8%	said	 their	household	 received	 food	aid,	 3,1%	of	households	 received	 credits,	 1,7%	
benefited	from	training/advice,	2%	said	they	profited	in	the	form	of	salaries	or	rents	and	13,3%	
reported	to	have	benefited	form	various	other	services.
We	then	asked	respondents	to	rate	the	contribution	of	different	actors	to	the	provision	of	basic	
services (drinking water, quality of roads, quality of schooling, agricultural production, access 
to	electricity,	more	jobs)	during	the	last	two	years.	
Figure 3: Percentage of respondents agreeing that international development actors contributed positively 
to the specific sectors
About	61%	of	the	households	reported	a	positive	impact	of	international	development	agencies	
on	the	provision	of	drinking	water	and	on	the	on	the	quality	of	roads.	41%	thought	the	deve-
lopment	agencies	helped	to	improve	the	quality	of	schooling.	16%	reported	a	positive	impact	
on	agricultural	production,	12,	2%	indicated	that	international	development	agencies	helped	
to	improve	access	to	electricity,	and	2,	6%	agreed	that	international	development	agencies	hel-
ped	to	create	more	jobs.	These	findings	confirm	expectations.	Investments	in	water,	roads	and	
schools	were	prioritized	by	the	international	community	in	North	East	Afghanistan	and	they	
produced visible and quick impacts. By contrast, capacity building, training and job-generating 
programs were less prominent and they take more time to generate results.
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Western vs. traditional values
Acceptance of the peacebuilding mission also requires that the population perceives the poli-
cies of the peacebuilders as essentially compatible with their own value systems. Theoretically, 
incompatibilities	can	occur	with	regard	to	a	wide	range	of	issues	and	on	different	levels	but	it	
could be argued that the tensions and frictions will be felt strongest when it comes to issues of 
daily life. We therefore decided to focus on attitudes with regard to gender equality, schooling 
and presence of armed forces – issues which lie at the heart of the liberal peace building mis-
sion	and	that	will	affect	local	communities.	We	formulated	six	statements	and	asked	about	the	
respondents’	 attitudes	 towards	 these	 statements.	Specifically,	we	asked	whether	 respondents	
thought that state schooling for boys has a positive impact for the community, whether state 
schooling for girls had a positive impact for the community, whether state schooling was com-
plementary	to	local	customs	and	Islamic	values,	how	respondents	valued	off-farm	job	oppor-
tunities for both men and women, and whether developmental aid and the presence of foreign 
troops presented a threat to local way of life and Islamic values.
We assumed that, in general, positive attitudes towards gender equality and positive attitudes 
towards the presence of development agencies and foreign troops signal a higher level of ac-
ceptance of the international peace building mission.
We	found	surprisingly	high	support	for	state	schooling,	girls’	enrollment	in	schools,	and	off-
farm job opportunities of men and women. All households agreed that education of boys has 
a	positive	impact	on	the	community	and	only	39	(out	of	2034)	households	disagreed	with	the	
statement that education for girls has a positive impact on the communities.
A	large	majority	of	households	agreed	that	it	would	be	good	if	off-farm	job-opportunities	were	
increased	for	both	men	and	women;	only	13,6%	of	the	sample	disagreed	with	this.	However,	
when	we	asked	 in	more	general	 terms,	we	also	 found	 that	21%	of	 respondents	 thought	 that	
foreign	developmental	aid	threatens	local	way	of	life	and	Islamic	values;	43	%	of	households	
even thought the presence of foreign troops posed a threat to the local way of life and Islamic 
values	in	the	community.	This	seems	to	contradict	respondents’	surprisingly	high	support	for	
girls’	schooling	and	women	off-farm	labour.	It	seems	that	the	high	support	for	the	specific	and	
tangible work that international agencies do is tempered with a generally cautious attitude to-
wards foreign presence.
How respondents see the state
Presumably,	successful	state-building	should	be	reflected	in	a	high	legitimacy	of	the	state	and	
in the experience that the state has the capacity to solve problems and provide services. Several 
questions	were	asked	to	find	out	about	how	respondents	see	the	emerging	Afghan	state.	In	ge-
neral,	we	find	that	the	state	is	credited	with	having	contributed	to	the	overall	positive	general	
trends.	However,	we	also	find	that	the	state	is	virtually	not	present	when	we	asked	about	specific	
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services. Hence, while the abstract notion of the state is met with considerable credit, the expe-
rience	of	beneficial	state-society	interactions	is	all	but	missing.
For	example,	90	%	of	respondents	thought	that	the	government	had	contributed	to	better	se-
curity	during	the	last	two	years.	We	then	also	asked	respondents	to	rate	the	government’s	con-
tribution to progress in the provision of basic sectors and services. The results show that the 
respondents – quite realistically – perceive the government as having very little impact, if at all: 
34	%	of	respondents	thought	the	government	helped	to	improve	the	quality	of	schooling.	5%	
of the households reported a positive impact of the government on the provision of drinking 
water.	13%	reported	a	positive	impact	on	the	quality	of	roads.	6%	reported	a	positive	impact	on	
agricultural	production,	3%	indicated	that	government	helped	to	improve	access	to	electricity,	
and	only	0.3%	agreed	 that	 the	government	helped	 to	create	more	 jobs.	Hence	 the	state	gets	
much less credit for progress in these sectors than the international development agencies. 
Figure 4: Percentage of respondents indicating that the actor contributed to improvement in basic services 
and infrastructure
Respondents	also	rated	the	conflict	solving	capacity	of	the	state	as	being	very	low.	When	asked	
to	which	institutions	they	would	turn	if	 involved	in	a	conflict	about	natural	resources,	most	
respondent	said	they	would	turn	to	the	elders	or	to	the	village	Shura	(the	village	council)	first.	
Only	2%	would	in	the	first	place	turn	to	the	district	administration.	No	respondents	would	turn	
to	the	provincial	authorities	in	the	first	place,	and	only	6%	would	turn	to	provincial	authorities	
as	a	second	choice.	When	asked	which	institutions	solved	conflicts	in	a	just	way	most	often,	re-
spondents rated elders and local Shura as much more just as provincial and district administra-
tion.	88%	thought	that	elders	sometimes	or	always	solved	conflicts	in	a	just	way,	78%	thought	
this	was	true	for	the	local	Shura,	38%	for	provincial	authorities,	and	34%	for	district	administra-
tion.	30%	also	thought	that	the	district	administration	never	solved	conflicts	in	a	just	way,	whe-
reas	only	4%	thought	that	its	decisions	were	always	just.	To	some	extent,	this	question	seems	
to	be	a	hypothetical	one	anyway,	reflecting	rather	general	attitudes	than	real	experiences.	When	
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asked	whether	the	state	has	been	involved	in	a	case	of	conflict	regulation	within	the	community	
or between communities, the overwhelming majority could not recall such an instance.
Echoing	findings	from	previous	studies	in	the	East	of	Afghanistan	we	also	find	that	conflict	
regulation	is	by	large	unprotected	from	corruption	or	violent	means.	85%	of	respondents	felt	
that	financial	bribes	were	always	or	sometimes	used	to	influence	an	outcome;	67%	saw	kinship	
ties	as	influential,	and	34%	thought	that	force	way	always	or	sometimes	applied.
Finally, we asked respondents to rate how often the district and provincial administration took 
care	of	the	needs	of	the	village	population.	Only	3%	thought	that	this	happened	always	or	fre-
quently,	whereas	31%	thought	it	happened	rarely	and	37%	thought	it	never	happened.
Summing	up,	we	find	that	respondents	are	prepared	to	give	the	general	notion	of	the	state	some	
credit	for	the	overall	positive	trends;	but	when	it	comes	to	tangible	interaction	and	service	pro-
vision, the state is virtually absent. It is only very modestly credited for having contributed to po-
sitive	changes	in	schooling	and	roads	and	it	is	virtually	absent	in	the	field	of	conflict	regulation.
How respondents see the community
In general, the picture that emerges from the survey portrays the Afghan communities as largely 
self-governed,	with	a	very	respected	and	influential	Shura	(the	village	council)	that	is	attributed	
with	a	great	deal	of	conflict	solving	capacity.	The	Shura	is	seen	as	immune	to	manipulation	by	
outsiders and as representing all households.
An	overwhelming	majority	(76%)	sees	either	the	head	of	Shura	or	the	elders	as	the	most	influ-
ential	people	in	the	village.	Of	these	respondents	85%	see	the	elders	or	head	of	shura	as	much	
more	important	to	solve	“significant	problems	of	the	community”	than	the	district	administra-
tion.
70%	thought	that	the	Shura	usually	takes	decisions	which	are	in	the	best	interest	of	the	whole	
community,	only	2,5%	thought	that	the	Shura	usually	takes	decisions	which	are	in	the	best	inter-
est	of	a	few	households	only.	25%	refused	to	answer	this	question.	About	25%	of	all	interviewed	
households had a member regularly attending the Shura. Interestingly, those household who 
had a member in the Shura were a bit more skeptical with regard to the Shura´s impartiality.
Most respondents thought that the Shura acted quite independently from interference and ma-
nipulation	by	powerful	outsiders.	69%	also	thought	the	Shura	was	involved	in	the	identification	
of	development	projects,	and	another	69%	that	a	specific	project	was	chosen	because	a	majority	
of	households	wanted	it,	rather	than	because	a	few	powerful	households	or	an	NGO	wanted	it.
In general, around half of the respondents saw their community itself as having contributed to 
improving	life	in	the	community.	52%	of	respondents	thought	that	the	Shura	had	a	positive	im-
pact	on	the	overall	security	situation	during	the	last	two	years,	whereas	30%	thought	the	village	
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Shura had no impact at all. When asked whether respondents thought that their community 
had	contributed	to	improvements	with	regard	to	basic	services,	we	find	a	mixed	picture.	With	
regard to drinking water, agriculture and roads, around half of the respondents rather or fully 
agreed. However, the other half fully disagreed. We leave it for further research to explain this 
split	perceptions.	With	regard	to	electricity	and	the	quality	of	schooling,	86%,	respectively	66%	
fully disagreed with the notion that their community indeed contributed.
Sub-regional differences
Some	of	the	trends	that	we	have	presented	so	far	are	subject	to	sub-regional	variations.	Our	
sample allows for making statements about four districts: Imam Sahib, Taloqan, Aliabad and 
Warsaj.	In	the	following	passage	we	present	the	most	notable	differences	between	these	dis-
tricts.
Aliabad	has	 the	highest	percentage	of	respondents	 (86%)	who	think	that	 foreign	forces	have	
positively	contributed	to	security,	Warsaj	the	lowest	(75%).	But	people	in	Aliabad	also	feel	most	
threatened	 in	 general.	 Notably,	 Aliabad	 residents	 fear	 the	 Taliban	 more	 than	 other	 armed	
groups, whereas in Imam Sahib, Taloqan and Warsaj people are more afraid of criminal groups. 
This	reflects	geographic	peculiarities:	Warsaj	is	a	remote	district	which	is	not	often	exposed	to	
the presence of foreign forces and is relatively secure. Aliabad is located along the main road 
Kabul-Kunduz,	 the	influence	of	 the	Taliban	is	said	to	be	relatively	strong	and	foreign	forces	
often present.
The distribution of Western Values vs. local values also seems to follow regional patterns. We 
calculated a norms and value index based on six value statements that were designed to catch 
respondents’	attitudes	towards	gender	equality,	secular	schooling	and	presence	of	armed	forces	
and	development	organizations	(henceforth	called	Western	Values).	These	issues	lie	at	the	heart	
of	the	liberal	peace	building	mission	and	they	affect	local	communities	in	their	daily	life;	hence	
we treat higher sores as an indicator that the values and norms of respondents are compatible 
with	what	the	peace	builders	do;	lower	scores	indicate	potential	incompatibilities	which	may	
signal a lack of legitimacy of peace builders in the perception of respondents. The means of the 
households	show	variation	between	districts:	Imam	Sahib	has	the	highest	score	(8,95),	Aliabad	
the	lowest	(5,11).	Warsaj	and	Taloqan	are	in	between	(6.8).
Finally,	 concerning	 the	distribution	of	 aid	we	find	 little	 regional	differences	with	 regard	 to	
activities in the sectors of water, roads and schooling. But food aid, electricity and jobs are un-
evenly	distributed	among	districts,	probably	reflecting	geographical	idiosyncrasies.	Communi-
ties in Warsaj seem to have received more food aid and electricity and less irrigation projects 
than	communities	 in	other	districts.	Again,	our	data	here	reflects	geographical	peculiarities.	
Warsaj	has	no	need	 for	 irrigation	projects,	 and	NSP	 (National	Solidarity	Pact)	has	helped	 to	
build many hydro power stations.
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Causal impact of development aid
Until now we have reported the results from descriptive statistics. We also investigated causal 
relations	between	development	aid	and	a	range	of	dependent	variables,	using	OSL	regression	
analysis. In the appendix we detail our methodological approach and provide the results of the 
regressions.
First	we	investigated	the	impact	of	development	aid	on	Western	Values.	As	reported,	we	defi-
ned	“Western	Values”	based	on	respondents’	responses	to	six	statements.	Specifically,	we	asked	
whether respondents thought that state schooling for boys has a positive impact for the com-
munity, whether state schooling for girls had a positive impact for the community, whether 
state schooling was complementary to local customs and Islamic values, how respondents va-
lued	off-farm	job	opportunities	for	both	men	and	women,	and	whether	developmental	aid	and	
the presence of foreign troops presented a threat to the local way of life and Islamic values.
We	found	that	development	aid	has	a	moderate	but	significant	impact	on	Western	Values.	Our	
proxy	indicator	for	development	aid	explains	about	13%	of	the	variance.	By	entering	ethnicity,	
aid for individual households and peripheral location the models gains little in accuracy. The 
greatest	impact	has	a	dummy	variable	for	the	district,	which	explains	in	its	own	around	19%	of	
the	variance.	Hence	development	aid	has	a	small,	positive	and	significant	impact	on	attitudes	
toward the peacebuilding mission.
We used the same procedure for testing the impact of development aid on threat perceptions. 
Threat perception was proxied by an index constructed based on how much respondents said 
they	 felt	 threatened	by	different	actors	 (Taliban,	criminal	groups,	 local	and	non-local	armed	
groups,	international	troops).	We	find	that	the	impact	of	the	development	aid	is	significant	but	
very	weak.	The	aid	that	communities	received	explains	less	than	1%	of	variance.	The	intuition	
for this result is that development aid alone does not have an impact on the actual security thre-
ats	in	the	region;	hence	perceptions	of	security	threats	are	not	affected.
Likewise,	ethnicity	has	significant	but	small	impact,	explaining	less	than	1%	of	variance.	When	
looking	at	the	ethnicities	individually,	we	find	that	Tajiks	feel	slightly	more	threatened	than	
other	 groups,	 although	 the	 effect	 is	 very	weak.	Again,	 the	 strongest	 impact	 is	 found	 for	 the	
district dummies: people living in Aliabad feel most threatened, those in Warsaj least.
Finally, we investigated whether development aid per se has contributed to a more positive atti-
tude towards the Afghan government. We proxy satisfaction with the government by answers to 
the	question	“how	often	does	the	Woliswol	(district	government)	or	the	provincial	government	
take	care	of	the	needs	of	your	village?”.	We	found	a	significant	but	very	weak	impact	of	aid	on	
the level of satisfaction. Hence, the level of received aid does not lead to a more positive assess-
ment of the Afghan government on provincial and district level.
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Appendix
Measuring aid: A note on the statistical analysis
For	the	statistical	analysis	we	used	four	different	measures	for	aid.	First,	we	asked	respondents	
in	what	sectors	their	household	had	been	a	beneficiary	of	development	aid.	Second,	we	asked	
respondents	to	tell	us	in	what	sectors	their	community	as	whole	had	been	a	beneficiary	of	de-
velopment	projects.	These	measurements	are	respondent	based	and	they	reflect	not	necessarily	
the actual numbers of projects but rather whether respondents think that their community had 
profited	from	development	cooperation	in	a	given	sector.	Such	a	measure	is	by	default	subjec-
tive,	but	we	think	that	it	is	justified	in	so	far	as	the	remembered	aid	actually	reflects	the	utility	of	
a given project to the community better than the actual amount of money spent on the project. 
Likewise,	one	could	argue	that	the	utility	of	a	school	to	the	community	is	not	increased	if	the	
school was expensive to build, nor is the utility of a well reduced if the well was cheap. In other 
words, for our purpose it is more useful to know whether most respondents remember that a 
well	has	been	built	in	their	community	than	knowing	that	this	well	has	cost	10.000	or	20.000	
USD.
In addition, we created two expert-based measures. We asked our survey teams to establish lists 
of development projects that were implemented in each of the 77 communities of our sample, 
thereby	differentiating	between	sectors	and	modality	of	aid	projects.	To	a	certain	extent	these	
measures are less perception driven and more objective.
Once	we	 collected	 data	 on	 these	 four	measures,	we	 cross-checked	whether	 they	 pull	 in	 the	
same	direction.	Although	 they	 show	considerable	 variation	we	find	 that	 they	generally	 tend	
to have the same tendencies, thereby indicating that respondent-based measures and expert-
based measures actually capture the same underlying reality. A second important issue relates 
to	our	qualification	of	“much”	and	“little”	aid.	Our	respondent	based	measures	reflect	whether	
respondents	thought	that	their	household	or	their	community	had	profited	from	development	
activities	in	a	given	sector.	Hence,	we	define	“much	aid”	not	as	the	number	of	projects	but	as	
the	perception	of	whether	the	community	has	profited	or	not	from	development	cooperation	
in a given sector.
Data	exploration	revealed	that	communities	received	quite	different	mixes	of	development	aid.2 
For	example,	5,9%	of	the	communities	received	food	aid	(112	of	120	cases	in	Warsaj),	5,5%	train-
ing/advice/capacity	building	 (50	cases	Aliabad,	2	 in	Imam	Sahib,	28	 in	Taloqan,	32	 in	Warsaj),	
46,5%	of	communities	profited	from	schooling	projects,	14,2%	from	electricity	(269	of	289	cases	
in	Warsaj),	65,9%	from	projects	related	to	roads	and	bridges,	2,5%	from	projects	aimed	at	creat-
ing	jobs	(13	cases	in	Imam	Sahib,	37	in	Warsaj),	16%	received	projects	in	agricultural	extension	
services;	65,9%	reported	having	received	projects	related	to	drinking	water,	and	24,1%	related	
2	 Note	that	we	found	no	community	that	had	not	received	some	development	aid	during	the	precedent	
two years.
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to	irrigation	(mostly	in	Imam	Sahib).3 We also found clear regional patterns: food aid, electric-
ity and jobs are predominately found in Warsaj, whereas irrigation projects are predominately 
found outside Warsaj. Training and advice is underrepresented in Imam Sahib. All other vari-
ables seem to be free from severe regional accumulations.
Factor and reliability analysis showed that there is not one dimension underlying these vari-
ables, hence we could not create an index. In the end, we decided to group the communities in 
different	categories,	reflecting	the	mix	of	projects	they	received.	For	this,	we	used	Latent	Class	
Analysis	(LCA).	LCA	is	a	statistical	method	for	finding	subtypes	of	related	cases	(latent	classes)	
from	multivariate	categorical	data.	LCA	has	the	advantage	over	factor	analysis/cluster	analysis	
that	no	scaling	properties	have	to	be	assumed.	LCA	estimates	different	classes	of	units	of	ana-
lysis that can be characterized by a common pattern of category probabilities. The easiest case 
is	the	so	called	“One	Class	Solution”	that	corresponds	to	the	usual	sample-mean	based	analytic	
methods. In this solution it is assumed that all units of analysis stem from the same distributi-
on. In most cases this mean-based solution does not yield the most accurate description of the 
data.	In	LCA	solutions	with	an	ascending	number	of	classes,	class	belongings	are	estimated	and	
their	fit	to	the	data	is	evaluated	via	the	probability	that	the	estimated	model	produced	the	data	
(so-called	“likelihood”).	This	fit	is	compared	to	the	number	of	parameters	needed	to	estimate	
this	solution.	The	solution	which	indicates	the	best	fit	with	the	least	possible	parameters	is	the	
number	of	classes	to	be	used	to	describe	the	data	most	effectively.4
Using	LCA	we	were	able	to	group	the	units	of	analysis	into	five	classes:	Communities	in	the	
first	class	(expected	class	size	is	30%)	are	characterized	by	respondents’	perceptions	of	having	
profited	from	development	projects	dealing	with	drinking	water,	schooling	and	electricity.	The	
number	of	respondents	that	see	their	communities	having	profited	in	these	sectors	is	above	
the mean. With regard to roads and bridges, communities received less than the mean. Com-
munities in this class received no projects related to irrigation and food aid at all. Finally, the 
number of projects related to extension services and training is close to the mean. Summing 
up,	respondents	in	this	class	report	that	their	communities	have	profited	mainly	from	drinking	
water, roads and bridges, and schooling projects. We name this class Drinking Water, Road and 
Bridges, and Schooling.
The	second	class	(expected	size	24%)	reaches	the	lowest	expected	score,	i.e.	consists	of	respon-
dents reporting fewer development projects than the mean in any sector except for irrigation 
projects	which	are	close	to	the	mean.	No	respondent	in	this	class	reports	projects	related	to	
electricity, food aid or training. We name this class Low Coverage.
3	 Figures	relating	to	projects	of	which	the	individual	household	profited	are:	10,8%	of	all	households	
said	that	they	received	food	aid	(173	cases	of	219	in	Warsaj);	1,7%	training/advice	(19	of	35	households	
in	Aliabad);	2%	salary/rent	(36	of	41	cases	in	Warsaj;	the	other	5	in	Aliabad);	3,1%	credit	(most	cases	in	
Aliabad	and	Warsaj);	13,3%	other	services.
4	 We	used	the	BIC	to	evalute	the	fit	of	the	model.
Assessing the Contribution of International Actors in Afghanistan |  16
The	third	class	(expected	size	18%)	consists	of	an	above	average	number	of	respondents	repor-
ting development projects in the sectors of drinking water, roads and bridges, schooling and 
irrigation, as well as a slightly above average rate for extension services. They also report only 
very few projects related to electricity and food aid. In sum, communities in this class receive a 
high amount of projects. We name this class High Coverage.
The	fourth	class	(expected	size	17%)	consists	of	respondents	reporting	that	their	communities	
profited	from	drinking	water	and	(near	to)	average	rates	in	roads	and	bridges,	extension	ser-
vices	and	training.	No	project	in	the	sectors	schooling,	irrigation,	electricity	and	food	aid	was	
reported. We name this class Drinking Water and Roads and Bridges.
The	fifth	class	(expected	size	13%)	consists	of	communities	that	have	higher	than	average	numb-
ers of projects related to electricity and food aid, and also road and bridges. The number of 
drinking water projects is less than average and there is no irrigation project. The number of 
projects in schooling, extension services and training is close to the mean. We name this class 
Roads and Bridges, Electricity and Food Aid.
The	distribution	of	these	classes	is	contingent	of	the	district:	91,7%	of	all	cases	belonging	to	
class 5 are located in Warsaj, whereas most households in Imam Sahib belong to class 3.5
Based	on	results	of	the	LCA	we	created	a	dummy	variable	for	each	class,	reflecting	the	specific	
mix of development aid that a community received.
We	also	created	a	variable	that	reflects	the	number	of	development	projects	that	the	individual	
household	received	(Direct	Aid	Score).	We	used	question	56	(“Has	your	household	been	a	be-
neficiary	of	development	cooperation	during	the	last	two	years?”).	Since	households	were	only	
rarely	beneficiaries	of	development	projects,	conducting	a	LCA	on	this	variable	yielded	unsa-
tisfactory results. Therefore the qualitative information on which sectors the projects belonged 
to	was	dropped.	Instead	we	constructed	a	score,	coding	„0“	when	no	help	was	received	by	the	
individual	household,	„1“	if	projects	in	one	sector	were	received,	„2“	if	projects	in	two	or	more	
sectors were received.
Next	we	created	a	variable	for	the	ethnic	belonging	(PASHTU,	UZBEK,	TAJIK,	NOMAD)	of	the	
respondent.	Some	scholars	argue	that	attitudes	toward	foreign	presence	differ	between	ethnic	
groups	and	that	especially	among	Pashtu	the	mistrust	towards	the	international	peacebuilders	
may	be	greater	than	among	minority	groups.	Creating	dummies	for	Pashtu,	Uzbek,	Tajik	and	
Nomad	allows	for	testing	this	assumption.
5 We refrain from reporting results from individual communities due to lack of space. We looked at the 
levels of unanimity among respondents within a given community. We qualify a community as unani-
mous	if	90%	or	more	of	all	respondents	report	the	same	number	of	projects.	We	find	that	overall	36%	
of	the	communities	qualify	as	unanimous.	(29%	in	Aliabad,	30%	in	Imam	Sahib,	55%	in	Taloqan	and	
30%	in	Warsaj).
6	 Strictly	speaking	Nomad	is	not	an	ethnic	group	but	a	socio-professional	group,	defined	by	the	liveli-
hood.	Most	are	Pashtu.
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We	also	created	a	dummy	(PERIPHERY),	indicating	whether	a	community	was	easy	accessible,	
or	remotely	located.	One	way	of	thinking	about	the	impact	of	peripheral	location	is	that	the	
more	remote	a	village	is,	the	more	cautious	it	may	be	toward	the	peace	building	mission.	On	
the other hand, it could also be that remote villages are more in need of development aid, and 
less	exposed	to	propaganda	efforts	by	anti-western	or	anti-central	government	forces.	Hence	we	
wanted to empirically investigate whether peripheral location was a valid predictor.
We	created	a	dummy	for	the	four	districts	(Aliabad,	Imam	Sahib,	Taloqan	and	Warsaj).	There	
is	not	one	specific	hypothesis	that	we	expect	to	test	with	the	district	dummies.	Rather,	we	take	
the	district	dummy	as	a	black-box	for	the	combined	effect	of	other,	unobserved	influences.	If	
one	or	all	district	dummies	are	significant,	as	we	expect	it	to	be,	we	take	this	as	a	marker	for	
an idiosyncratic combination of factors that is intrinsic to this given district and which then 
requires	additional	research.	At	the	very	least,	significant	district	dummies	signal	that	condi-
tions	differ	across	districts,	hence	development	aid	should	study	these	differences	and	design	
policies accordingly.
A	dummy	variable	(NSP)	was	created	for	communities	in	which	NSP	(National	Solidarity	Pro-
gram)	projects	were	already	implemented.	In	Afghanistan	community	driven	development	is	a	
major	part	of	the	international	community’s	strategy	for	rebuilding	the	country.	The	so-called	
National	Solidarity	Program	has	focused	on	community	participation	through	Community	De-
velopment	Councils	(CDC)	that	have	begun	a	wide	range	of	projects,	from	irrigation	and	water	
supplies	 to	capacity	building	for	 local	governance.	Creating	a	dummy	for	NSP	lets	us	assess	
whether	NSP	communities	show	different	characteristics.
Next,	we	computed	 two	variables	 that	capture	communal	 ties	and	communal	mobilizations.	
The Village Help Index captures the cohesiveness and mobilization capacities of a community. 
It is based on the perception of respondents with regard to how easy it is to get help in their 
village, for example for harvesting, and what one was expected to give in return. A lower score 
reflects	that	one	rather	has	to	pay	for	help,	a	higher	score	that	one	rather	has	to	return	the	favor	
(mutual	exchange).
A	Village	Norm	Index	was	created,	based	on	whether	respondents	thought	that	the	community	
should correct families whose behavior deviate for communal norms, and whether respondents 
expected social sanction in case a family would not participate in hashar or similar social obli-
gation.
Finally, we created a variable for vulnerability, indicating how much a community is threatened 
by natural disasters, and a variable indicating the size of the village.
We	 then	 tested	 the	 effect	 of	 our	 study	 variable	 (development	 aid)	 on	 respondents’	 attitudes	
towards	the	activities	of	the	peace	builders	using	OLS	regression.	All	results	are	reported	in	
the regression table in the appendix. They can be summarized as follows: development aid 
has a positive impact on attitudes towards the peace building mission. Communities that have 
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broadly	profited	from	development	aid	show	greater	support	for	international	actors	and	their	
objectives. Development aid, however, does not lead to a lower threat perception, indicating 
that development aid per se has little impact on objective security threats. Threat perceptions 
differ	between	districts.	People	in	Aliabad	feel	more	threatened,	and	they	fear	the	Taliban.	Peo-
ple in Imam Sahib feel least threatened. We found no evidence that development aid has so far 
increased Afghan state capacities in the perception of respondents. The state is virtually absent 
as	a	problem	solver	and	service	provider.	This	perception	is	hardly	affected	by	levels	of	received	
development aid.
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Regression Table
Table 1: Linear Regression Analyses for Western Values, Threat Perception, and Satisfaction with Provin-
cial Government
Dependent Variable
Independent Variables
Western Values Threat Perception
Satisfaction 
with provincial 
government (Q54)
Q57_class2 -0.64 (0.15)*** -0.21 (0.11) -0.30 (0.06)***
Q57_class3 0.13 (0.15) -0.29 (0.12)* 0.20 (0.06)**
Q57_class4 -0.64 (0.13)*** -0.14 (0.10) -0.22 (0.05)***
Q57_class5 -0.39 (0.19)* 0.18 (0.15) 0.05 (0.07)
Direct Aid 0.19 (0.11) -0.07 (0.08) -0.04 (0.04)
NSP 0.35 (0.18)* 0.18 (0.14) -0.18 (0.07)*
Nomad 0.92 (0.25)*** -0.37 (0.20) 0.20 (0.10)*
Pashtu -0.25 (0.17) 0.04 (0.13) -0.11 (0.07)
Tajik 0.42 (0.20)* 0.44 (0.15)** 0.21 (0.08)**
Uzbek 0.28 (0.15) 0.27 (0.11)* 0.03 (0.06)
Security Change (Q10) 1.15 (0.11)*** -0.80 (0.08)*** 0.11 (0.04)*
Aliabad -0.34 (0.23) 1.57 (0.18)*** -0.05 (0.09)
Imam Sahib 2.05 (0.27)*** 0.43 (0.20)* 0.36 (0.10)***
Taloqan 1.00 (0.30)** 1.35 (0.23)*** -0.12 (0.11)
PERIPHERY 0.17 (0.05)** 0.02 (0.04) 0.00 (0.02)
Resourcebase (Village) -0.09 (0.07) -0.12 (0.06)* 0.03 (0.03)
Vulnerability (Village) 0.47 (0.11)*** -0.26 (0.08)** -0.05 (0.04)
Resourcebase (Household, Q9) 0.55 (0.06)*** -0.40 (0.05)*** 0.13 (0.02)***
Village Norms 0.28 (0.03)*** 0.01 (0.02) 0.11 (0.01)***
Village Help -0.023 (0.02) 0.05 (0.01)*** 0.00 (0.06)
Number of Projects (Village) 0.05 (0.04) 0.23 (0.03)*** -0.04 (0.02)**
Constant -3.55 5.03 0.38
Adjusted R-squared 0.50*** 0.24*** 0.30***
Sample Size 1676 1862 1824
Note: The coefficients given are unstandardized coefficients. T-scores are provided in parentheses.
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Map
Map 1: Surveyed Communities in Aliabad, Imam Sahib, Taloqan and Warsaj
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